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ABSTRACT
Economic convergence of the new member states (NMS) of the EU
towards the old EU countries (EU-15), not only in terms of real
income, but also in nominal terms, is of paramount importance for
the w hole of  the E U. We build  a dynam ic CGE m od el, starting
from the Balassa-Samuelson two-sector framework, but modify
and enlarge it with forward-looking investment, consumption, and
labour mobility behaviour to address several other issues like
welfare and sustainability in terms of foreign indebtedness. At the
same time we evaluate the impact of convergence on the EU-15
c o u n t r i e s  a l s o ,  b y  e n d o g e n i s i n g  o f f s h o r i n g  a n d  t h e  r e l a t e d  F D I
flows from them to the NMS. Thereby we identify various effects
o f  r e l o c a t i o n  a n d  g l o b a l i s a t i o n  o n  t h e  E U - 1 5  e n l a r g i n g  t h e
stand ard  set of  ef f ects of  g lobalisation and  d em onstrate the k ey
role of  their dy nam ic nature in the process of  converg ence. We
f i n d  t h a t  i n  a  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i um  s e t t i n g  f e a r s  o f  l a r g e  a d v e r s e
effects of a relocation of EU-15 manufacturing to the NMS are not
well founded. In contrast, offshoring appears to be a win-win case
f o r  b o t h  t h e  E U - 1 5  a n d  t h e  N M S  i n  t e r m s  o f  r e a l  i n c o m e .  T h e
convergence of the NMS is fairly rapid, but will involve a
persistent rapid inflation rate.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation is the key economic driving force in today’s world, leading to intensified 
international economic integration on a global scale. This process contains, as previous 
trends of integration, a truly dynamic pattern with forces leading to shifts in the centres of 
gravity of global economic activity, but at the same time also a process of convergence 
both in real and nominal terms which may be beyond previous comparison. Imagine as a 
final outcome a widespread convergence of the global economy in terms of income levels. 
This possibility would in effect turn around many aspects of the current global economic 
scene that are based on wide disparities in incomes and costs. This means that the global-
isation process has to be analysed using two central approaches: finding out the general 
equilibrium at the level of the global economy and in a time dimension in order to be able 
to depict its subsequent path. 
Also in research on European integration the focus has shifted from the effects of EU 
enlargement to the evaluation of convergence in income levels and inflation differentials 
of the new member states (NMS) towards the old (EU-15).1 This process is of paramount 
importance to the NMS, but it is also important for the homogeneity of the Union and of 
substantial significance to the EU-15 countries as well, where a concern has emerged that 
industry relocation to the new member countries, where production costs are much lower, 
may pose a threat to the former.2  
It is straightforward and commonplace to make basic mechanical calculations of the 
catching-up process of the new member countries towards the EU-15. More analytical ap-
proaches attempt to evaluate the role of trade and integration on growth and, conse-
quently, convergence of the NMS’ income levels towards those of the old EU countries. In 
this line of research there are, on the one hand, purely empirical studies that are usually 
based on cross-country growth regressions where the integration and trade effects are usu-
ally captured by different dummy variables or openness measures (e.g. Dollar 1992, de-
Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik 1993, Edwards 1993, Harrison 1995, Sachs and Warner 
1995 and Henrekson, Torstensson and Torstensson 1996, and more recently, Kaitila 2004, 
Noguer and Siscart 2005 and Chang, Kaltani and Loayza 2005). The conclusion on the 
role of regional economic integration behind growth is somewhat ambiguous in this litera-
ture but, in general, trade openness and economic growth are in a positive relationship 
with each other. Moreover, there is evidence that trade openness has an effect on income 
disparities. Ben-David (1996) and Ben-David and Kimhi (2000) provide evidence that an 
increase in the extent of trade among groups of countries tends to decrease intra-group in-
come disparities and increase the speed of convergence. Furthermore, by breaking up the 
groups into pairs, Ben-David and Kimhi find that exports from a poorer country to a richer 
one and imports from a richer country to a poorer one have boosted convergence. This re-
sult is relevant also in the context of European integration especially after the Eastern 
enlargement.3 
                                                      
1  See e.g. Kaitila, Alho and Nikula (2007) for a recent aggregative analysis of convergence in a European con-
text. 
2 See Euroframe (2005), OECD (2007a,b) and Denis, Mc Morrow and Röger (2007) for surveys on 
globalisation and relocation issues.  
3  For an extensive survey on theoretical and empirical convergence literature, see De La Fuente (2000) and in 
the context of EU integration Kaitila (2003).  2
The studies listed above are normally made in terms of real income per capita only. But 
of equal significance for the EU-15 and firms offshoring their activities to low-cost coun-
tries is nominal convergence in relative wages and prices, i.e. real appreciation. The infla-
tionary development in the new member countries is also vital, e.g., from the point of 
view of ECB monetary policy and the entrance of the new member countries into the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. See Figures 1 and 2 on real and nominal convergence to 
date.4 
The basic tool for such a comprehensive evaluation of convergence is the seminal 
Balassa-Samuelson model (or the Scandinavian model of inflation, see Klau and Mihaljek 
2003), which divides the economy into two sectors, the open (tradable goods and services) 
and closed sector (non-tradable goods and services). This is also the starting point in our 
paper. We, however, modify and extend the basic model in several ways, i.a., with the key 
result in empirical growth literature, which states that the GDP growth rate is not constant 
over time, but that it is positively related to the initial gap in income levels so that poorer 
countries grow faster than wealthier ones, i.e. there is so-called β-convergence (see e.g. 
Barro 1991). Taking this fact into account has a major impact on our view of the speed of 
future convergence of the NMS. 
But altogether, this basic framework is still deficient in discussing many important is-
sues of convergence. Capital accumulation is an important element to consider. FDI in-
flows have been an important channel for the NMS to acquire modern technology and 
business practices but also to finance their often large current account deficits so that the 
new member countries have not themselves had to finance the whole burden of their capi-
tal accumulation. This has delivered a marked welfare gain to them. Accordingly, we shall 
endogenise cross-border factor flows, both capital flows through FDI and labour flows 
through migration, and allow for spillovers on total factor productivity through FDI from 
the EU-15 to the NMS. Related to this, Baldwin and Seghezza (1996a,b) discuss and ana-
lyse trade-induced investment-led growth, which combines old growth models and new 
trade (imperfect competition) models, and trade-induced productivity-led growth, which 
combines new growth models with new trade (imperfect competition) models. These pa-
pers argue that there is strong evidence of the former, having the Iberian EU enlargement 
as an example, but do not find strong evidence or obvious examples of the latter. The 
Eastern enlargement and the development in the NMS fits the former potentially as well. 
The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the EU-15 and the NMS has been evaluated in a 
computable general equilibrium framework earlier by e.g. Baldwin, Francois and Portes 
(1997), Keuschnigg and Kohler (2002), Heijdra, Keuschnigg and Kohler (2004), Sulamaa and 
Widgrén (2004) and Vaittinen (2000, 2004). Keuschnigg and Kohler (2002) and Heijdra, 
Keuschnigg and Kohler (2004) built a dynamic model, and Vaittinen used a dynamic version 
of GTAP, whereas Baldwin, Francois and Portes, and Sulamaa and Widgrén used a static ver-
sion of the GTAP model. A common conclusion in all these studies is that the old EU coun-
tries obtain relatively small gains from EU enlargement even in the long run, but the NMS 
obtain considerable gains especially in the long run and when all integration effects, i.e. trade 
liberalisation, increasing foreign investment, EU budget transfers and migration, have been 
taken into account. In Vaittinen (2004) the long-run gain in NMS’ GDP that is due to the first 
three effects is 15 per cent. Outward migration decreases the impact to 8 − 13 per cent, de-
pending on the propensity to migrate. From the point of view of the EU-15 the figures are a 
loss of 0.2 per cent and a gain of 0.2 − 1.5 per cent, respectively. The study thus indicates 
                                                      
4  Throughout the paper we refer with the term NMS, as in Figures 1 and 2, to the average of the 10 new mem-
ber states joining the EU in 2004 and 2007, except Cyprus and Malta, which solution is caused by data limita-
tions concerning the latter countries.   3
GDP convergence between the EU-15 and NMS although that is not the prime purpose of this 
study by Vaittinen. 
In the extension to the basic framework, we consider not only the income path, but also 
the consumption behaviour of the new member countries by introducing a forward-
looking consumption function. This is important in the sense that a part of the consumers 
in the new member countries discount the future path of convergence of their real wage 
rise in their consumption behaviour already today, which leads to initial current account 
deficits. This way we are able to tackle the important sustainability issue of convergence 
in terms of foreign indebtedness of the NMS, but at the same time it also has an effect on 
resource allocation within the NMS and thereby on growth and inflation, as we shall see 
below. As indicated by van de Klundert and Smulders (2001) international lending and 
borrowing can have an impact on convergence and overtaking of the rich countries by the 
poorer. The argument runs in the manner that the rich countries start to invest abroad and 
not in the home economy which will shift capital accumulation and lead to overtaking by 
the poorer partner. Here we widen this possibility in the sense that borrowing leading to 
intensive consumption of the non-traded goods can also lead to slower convergence.  
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Figure 2.  Nominal convergence: Price level (ratio of current exchange rate to 
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Sources: OECD; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database. 
Our next extension is to build a framework to evaluate the impact of NMS convergence on 
the EU-15 countries, a typically neglected issue in the Balassa-Samuelson context. In the 
analysis of the economic relations between the EU-15 and the NMS, the aim of this paper is 
to take recourse to the recent approaches of outsourcing, the theory of trade in tasks, see 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,b) and Baldwin (2006), and enlarging this analysis by 
adding some new effects of international outsourcing, and especially specifying these in a 
structural numerical framework, and analysing their effects both on the home and recipient 
countries of offshoring.  
This new theory of globalisation has identified three basic effects related to international 
outsourcing: productivity, job and price effects. These are typically analysed using a two fac-
tor framework, distinguishing skilled and non-skilled workers, but they can be identified also 
in the case of a single type of labour as remarked with respect to productivity by Baldwin 
(2006, 39). The productivity effect emerges because labour can be allocated to its most pro-
ductive use and the productivity of the outsourced labour is thereby enhanced. The price ef-
fect is derived from the fact that the price of the output, the cost of which is reduced, will also 
go down. The job effect simply tells that outsourcing displaces workers from their previous 
jobs and will lead to a downward adjustment in real wages. In contrast to these seminal pa-
pers, we endogenise the offshoring decisions as called for in OECD (2007b), and distinguish 
offshoring both in the final and intermediate goods so that we explicitly model here the vehi-
cles of offshoring through vertical and horizontal FDI flowing from the EU-15 to the NMS. In 
addition, we explicitly model the role of capital input, so far omitted from an explicit consid-
eration in the connection of offshoring. Thereby, we are able to identify some further effects 
of globalisation. The main one is the competitiveness effect which stems from the fact that  5
increased outsourcing to low-cost countries leads to an increase in productivity and profitabil-
ity of the EU-15 firms. The firms can use this increase in their capital investment to improve 
their access in the global markets. On the other hand, horizontal and vertical FDI linked to 
offshoring will lead to an increase of the supply of tradables from the enlarged EU to the 
global markets, which is the price effect. Labour mobility is the last interaction between the 
regions to be analysed. In addition, we simultaneously analyse the effects of offshoring also 
on the recipient country, an item usually neglected in these analyses so far.  
Altogether, our analysis gives a richer picture of the globalisation process, although in the 
explicit modelling we analyse the convergence process of the enlarged European Union. All 
in all, a dynamic two-region CGE model with forward-looking consumption, investment, FDI, 
offshoring and labour mobility decisions is built with elements of endogenous growth, as FDI 
inflow boosts total factor productivity in the NMS.  
In order to analyse more closely the relocation and offshoring issue, we build two sce-
narios of convergence with the aid of our two-region CGE model: the baseline where we 
allow offshoring and the FDI stock to grow in response to the lower cost in the NMS. We 
contrast this to an alternative scenario where the FDI stock of the EU-15 in the NMS re-
mains in real terms throughout the period to 2030 at the level where it was in 2005. The 
key results of this exercise are that an inflow of FDI and more intensified offshoring is a 
win-win case, where both the EU-15 and NMS gain, the latter more, in terms of GDP and 
real income. The effects on GDP are very small for the EU-15, but clearly higher in terms 
of national income. This helps to put the likely magnitude of international outsourcing ac-
tivities within Europe in its proper place as a factor influencing the European economy. 
However, there is a polarisation in this connection so that increased offshoring leads to a 
slight reduction in real wages in the EU-15 and a more marked rise in profits.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we formulate a more complete model 
than the basic Balassa-Samuelson model for the NMS with endogenous capital accumula-
tion, forward-looking consumption behaviour and labour mobility. In Section 3, we com-
bine the EU-15 countries into the model by considering what effects the relocation of pro-
duction into the new member countries will have on the EU-15. Section 4 outlines the 
global linkages and Section 5 presents the calibration of the model and the key results of 
the convergence simulations. Section 6 concludes.  
2  A DYNAMIC CGE MODEL OF NMS CONVERGENCE 
The Balassa-Samuelson two-sector model is the standard tool to analyse both real and 
nominal convergence as it links them neatly together. This is also our starting point. How-
ever, as stated above, this framework is fairly simple and does not allow for elaboration of 
several key aspects of convergence. For example, it does not explicitly deal with optimal 
growth, capital accumulation and foreign FDI flows, nor the internal resource allocation 
between the sectors identified in the model, i.e. the open (tradables, T) and closed (non-
tradables, N). Although output is very important, welfare is based more on consumption, 
which is typically optimised intertemporally. Also labour migration and the impact of 
convergence on the point of reference, here the EU-15, are ignored. These are all very im-
portant issues linked to the convergence path of the NMS and justify the construction of a 
more articulated growth model for the two regions.  
 We build a neoclassical growth model retaining the two sectors in the new member 
countries with all markets operating under perfect competition and full employment. We  6
separate the production sectors so that output in the sheltered sector is based on domestic 
demand. Capital and labour is used in both sectors. We incorporate forward-looking be-
haviour in decisions involving intertemporal choice with respect to consumption, invest-
ment and labour mobility. However, the decision on capital input in the sheltered sector 
follows passively from output in this sector.  
Total production (GDP) in the NMS is the sum of four items: production by domestic 
firms in the open and sheltered sectors, and production linked to both horizontal and verti-
cal FDI by EU-15 firms operating in the NMS. There are thus two types of firms in the 
open sector in the NMS, domestic and foreign owned, while in the nontradable sector 
there are only domestic firms. The structure of production in the model is depicted in Fig-
ure 3. The items related to FDI are elaborated in more detail in Section 3.  
We define a Cobb-Douglas production function for the domestic tradable (T) sector 
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where IT is investment, PT the price of tradables, λT the shadow price of capital, aT the cost 
of adjustment parameter, δ the rate of depreciation, ρ the real rate of return (marginal 
product) on the current capital stock and rT the real interest rate measured in prices of 
tradables. We assume that there are no adjustment costs related to labour input. 
The internal resource allocation between the two production sectors is important for the 
convergence process and takes place through the factor markets simply as follows. The 
demand for labour and capital in the nontradable sector are based on the demand for the 
domestic goods produced in this sector. The demand for the consumer goods produced by 
the open and closed sectors is based on an instantaneous CES preference function, which 
implies that 











where QN is the production of non-tradables, C is aggregate consumption, determined by 
intertemporal optimisation, see below, 0<τN<1 is the preference parameter, ϕ the elasticity 
of substitution in consumption, PN the price on non-tradables and P is the aggregate price 
level. The labour input LN and capital input KN in the closed sector are then based on the 
demand for factors, 
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where  N l  and kN are the unit factor requirements and AN is the total factor productivity in 
the nontradables sector. The domestic factor allocation between the sectors takes place 
without frictions so that the remainder of the labour force in the NMS, not employed in 
the sheltered sector, is employed in the open sector. The NMS can export the rest of their 
open sector production, i.e. the part that is not consumed at home, at the international 
(world market) price level PT, which is elaborated in Section 4.  















It is important to recognise that the future convergence path of the NMS is taken into 
account, not only by firms in their investment behaviour, but also by local consumers. 
Next, we will specify forward-looking consumption behaviour, based on intertemporal 
optimisation. This is important because consumers in the NMS, or a part of them, discount 
the future convergence path of the real income and use it already today in their consump-
tion behaviour through borrowing. This has an impact on the current account and the sus-
tainability of the convergence process in the NMS, too.  
The financial market in the model operates so that households see through the corporate 
veil in the sense that they first of all own that share of the capital stock in the open sector 
which is not owned and financed by foreigners and are also responsible for the debts of 
these firms. Consequently, their consumption behaviour is based on financial assets less 
the aggregate national foreign debt, denoted by B, not including the debts related to in- 8
ward FDI. Expected human wealth H, i.e., the discounted stream of future real labour in-










t H  (5) 
where W is the wage rate in the NMS and r is the real rate of interest measured now in the 
overall price level P in the NMS.  
There is an initial pressure in the NMS towards borrowing by the forward-looking con-
sumers to smoothen their consumption path and thereby to run a deficit in the current ac-
count. However, it would not be sensible to assume that the consumers can and will be-
have like this because the size of the current account deficit would then become unsus-
tainable and the initial deficit would be much higher than the actual, see Section 5.1. This 
situation of a limited role for borrowing also reflects the small role of human capital as 
collateral. In fact, as noted by Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995), only the capital 
stock owned by domestic agents, i.e. K − KFDI can serve as collateral for foreign debt.  
So, we assume that consumers in the new member countries are either forward looking 
or liquidity constrained. In the standard manner, consumption by the former group is 
based on expected human capital and current financial net wealth so that total real con-
sumption C1, if all consumers were forward looking, would be given by  
  ( ) 11 θ 1 − − =+ − tt t t t CH L E B , (6) 
where θ is the rate at which wealth is consumed, L is the total labour force in the NMS and E 
is the value of equity (shadow price multiplied by the volume of the capital stock) related to 
the domestically owned capital stock. We have to assume that in the long run the growth of 
real wages is lower than the real interest rate in order to get a solution for the equilibrium hu-
man capital in (5). We further fix the rate θ to be equal to 
** 0 − > e rg , where r* is the real rate 
of interest in the EU-15 and  is the potential growth rate of the EU-15 economy. Conse-
quently, after convergence has been completed vis-à-vis the EU-15, in a steady state equilib-
rium, consumption of human wealth and the rate at which it accumulates are the same. It will 
then (roughly) correspond to the current situation in the EU-15.  
*
e g
Current aggregate real income Y is determined by 
  , (7)  *
1, , 1 ρ − =− − + t t t t FDI t FDI t t YQi B K U −
where   is the aggregate GDP, i
* is the nominal interest rate on foreign debt, t Q ρFDI  is the 
rate of return on FDI in the NMS and U is the budgetary transfer to the NMS from the 
EU-15 through the EU budget. This item will be specified in more detail in Section 5.1. 
Consumption expenditure C2 if all the consumers were of the liquidity-constrained type 
would be simply given by 
  2 = t Cc Y t
)
, (8) 
where c is the constant propensity to consume out of current income. Now let h denote the 
fixed share of forward-looking consumers in total population and   the share of li-
quidity-constrained consumers. Aggregate consumption C is then reached by weighing (6) 
and (8) with these weights h and 1–h.  
( 1−h 9
Net foreign debt of the NMS accumulates through the current account deficit, which is 
by definition equal to the excess of domestic expenditure over domestic income. A part of 
it is financed by FDI inflows.  
Labour supply and mobility in the enlarged EU has been set aside so far. For simplicity, 
we assume individual labour supply to be fixed, but aggregate labour force is endogenous 
through migration. Migration from the NMS depends on the expected gain from migration 
in the form of the future income in the new member countries compared to that in the EU-
15 countries. Following Ottaviano (1999), the private cost of migration is modelled as an 
externality depending on the amount of people migrating, which is equated with the ex-
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where L is the labour force in the NMS, / = yYL  is the real disposable income per capita, 
q* is real income per capita in the EU-15 and μ > 0 is a parameter describing the cost of 
migration, and ut is the tax rate imposed on EU-15 labour to finance the transfers U to the 
NMS paid through the EU budget. G measures the expected future gain from migrating to 
the EU-15 from the NMS, relative to remaining in the NMS. 
Let us then turn to TFP growth. We use the core idea in the literature on growth and 
convergence, which specifies the key notion that the growth rate of TFP is not a constant, 
but an increasing function of the gap in the per capita income levels, i.e. we use the hy-
pothesis of the so-called β-convergence. Consequently, the NMS will grow faster than the 
wealthier EU-15 but this gap will diminish gradually over time. Let gt be the growth rate 
















where β0, β1 > 0, where q is the real GDP per capita in the NMS. As a long-run condition, 
we specify that when catching up will finally be completed at time N, i.e.
* = N N qq , the 
growth rate of TFP in the new member countries will also have converged to that in the 
EU-15, i.e. . This gives us the condition that in 
* = N gg N (10)
*
0 β = N g , and we can calibrate 
the parameter β1 from the condition that the initial growth rate g0 of the new member 
countries is the actually realised one at the initial income gap.  
Then consider the link between TFP and the inflow of FDI from the EU-15 and consider 
the impact of FDI on the productivity of domestic firms in the NMS through knowledge 
spillovers. This has been under intensive research recently, see e.g. Javorcik (2004) and 
Barr, Breedon and Miles (2004). There is also a technical argument related to the spill-
over. As supported by anecdotal evidence, foreign firms in the NMS are taken to produce 
with technology that is (almost) as advanced and thereby with productivity that is (almost) 
as high as in the EU-15 countries, but with lower costs. Below we assume that the firms in 
the NMS linked to vertical FDI are of this type. This will necessarily lead to a rise in pro-
ductivity in the NMS over time if the stock of FDI grows over time. We assume that the 
deceleration of TFP growth, as specified in (10), applies similarly to the rise of productiv-
ity in both the open and closed sectors in the NMS, so that the initial gap in the growth  10
rates between the two sectors applies all through the convergence process. Consequently, 
we specify for the TFP rise  
() ()
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,   (11) 
where ψ > 0 and  0 − 0

T ag is the initial growth differential between open sector TFP growth 
and that in the overall economy, assumed to be fixed over the convergence path. Specifi-
cation (11) includes an element of endogenous growth, as TFP growth also depends on 
FDI inflows. In general, we assume that technology is freely transferable between and 
within the two regions. 
We still need to specify the nominal side of the NMS economy. Following the Balassa-
Samuelson model, the wage rate W is determined by profit maximisation in the open sec-
tor (we omit in the sequel the time subscript when not needed), 
 (1 )
α α α − =− TT T WP A KL T . (12) 
This wage rate applies to all four production sectors of the NMS economy as the labour 
market is homogeneous. The price level in the sheltered sector is given by (4) as  
 (( ) ) / =+ + N NN Pl W k i d A N . (13) 
By aggregating over the two sectors we can derive the overall price level P on GDP.  
Let us finally make a remark on the nature of the convergence process and ask, whether 
the convergence of the NMS towards the income level of the EU-15 is inevitable, al-
though we have envisioned it to be a natural long-run outcome. However, this parity in 
incomes is not quite so definitive, since it is possible that a low growth scenario realises 
so that the growth rate of productivity in the sheltered sector of the NMS is lower than the 
growth rate of GDP in the EU-15. If simultaneously the elasticity of substitution ϕ in con-
sumption in (3) is low, more and more of the resources of the NMS will be absorbed into 
the sheltered sector through the equilibrium in the goods market. This would imply that 
the overall growth rate of the NMS will be reduced below that in the EU-15. Although this 
is not very likely, it is a real possibility. Also a high share of forward-looking consumers 
in (10) has an indirect effect on the speed of convergence, because the more the future 
convergence of incomes is discounted to affect present consumption, the bigger the shel-
tered sector and the slower the convergence and the higher the inflation rate in the NMS. 
A rapid inflation also lowers the real rate of interest in the NMS and thereby feeds to a 
higher initial level of the expected human capital leading to a higher rate of consumption. 
Evaluation of these issues requires a numerical assessment. 
3  THE IMPACT OF OFFSHORING AND NMS CONVER-
GENCE ON THE EU-15 
We then want to incorporate the EU-15 countries into the analysis as an endogenous block 
and see how the convergence process of the new member countries may affect them and 
vice versa. At times, the former raises a heated debate as to the relocation of firms and 
jobs from the EU-15 to the NMS and elsewhere and measures, both at the firm level to 
adjust to this pressure, and by policy makers to attract – or punish – firms to stay in the  11
EU-15, are under way. Therefore we have to describe those basic elements in the model 
through which growth and convergence of the NMS affects the EU-15 countries.  
The two regions are open to the rest of the world so that both can export to the global 
market the remainder of their production not consumed in Europe at the price level which 
also depends on the convergence process as the EU is a fairly big player in the global 
market, see below Section 4. The nominal interest rate is set in the world capital markets 
for both regions under free flows of finance and taken exogenous. The real rates of inter-
est then react to inflation in the manner explained above. 
There are six basic factors of interaction between the NMS and the EU-15 which we con-
sider. We follow the analysis in the recent literature on offshoring, see Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006a,b), but try to enlarge it in several aspects. So, as an extension to this litera-
ture, we endogenise the offshoring decisions. First, there is an outflow of FDI, both vertical 
and horizontal, into the new member countries, which causes a relocation of production from 
the EU-15 countries so that their employment and capital accumulation will slow down. Sec-
ond, as a result of vertical FDI there is more production in the form of subcontracting in the 
new member countries, and as the cost and price levels are lower there than at home, EU-15 
firms gain in competitiveness when they produce abroad. The EU-15 firms can use this ad-
vantage in their increased supply to the world markets. This should compensate at least partly 
for the initial loss in employment in the EU-15 countries once the relocation of production to 
the new member countries takes place. The productivity of the average EU-15 worker will 
also rise, because offshoring typically concerns less-than-average productivity jobs. Fourth, 
national income in the EU-15 countries will rise through a higher yield on capital investment 
in the new member countries than the cost of capital. And fifth, increased output in the NMS 
both in the form of horizontal or vertical FDI from the EU-15 may have a repercussion 
through the balance in the global market for tradables on the terms of trade, too. Finally, la-
bour migration flows also have an impact on the EU-15 economies as well as the NMS. Alto-
gether, it is important to put these effects into a dynamic context, as they are likely to change 
in magnitude over time. 
The EU-15 economy is considered to consist of two sectors: firms producing the final 
goods and firms producing intermediate goods, see Fig. 3 above. The final goods firms 
can outsource both a part of their final goods production and the purchase of intermediate 
goods to the NMS. In the case of the former type of offshoring we consider horizontal 
FDI, which means that a part of their total output supplied to the world markets is out-
sourced to take place in the NMS, instead of the EU-15. In the case of the latter we con-
sider vertical FDI. Gross (total) output Q
* in the EU-15 by the final goods firms is pro-
duced by combining the value added Y
* with intermediate goods input M
*, which is in a 
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where
** ξ = M Q andξ  is the share of intermediate goods in total production, 01 ξ <<. Value 
added Y* in the final goods firms in the EU-15 is produced using Cobb-Douglas technology 
with capital  and labour L
*,  
* K
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The behaviour of the final goods firms can be split into successive stages. These firms 
maximize their profits with respect to capital K* located in the home economy and labour 
input L* demanded in the EU-15 in the standard way, the former with a similar cost of ad-
justment structure as above in Eq. (1). Consider then the decision as to the horizontal FDI.  12
We assume that the EU-15 firms produce their final goods in the NMS with the same 
overall productivity level AT that prevails in the open sector in the NMS. However, fol-
lowing Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007), they face a real cost D1 (in terms of tradables), re-
lated to the degree of outsourcing, including a sunk cost. We specify somewhat differently 
so that this cost D1 depends directly on the extent of horizontal FDI (denoted FDI1) in-
vested in the NMS,  with all the parameters being posi-
tive and ν > 1. So, we assume that the cost of horizontal FDI depends negatively on the 
scale of activity in the EU-15. By bearing this cost, the firm collects profits from the in-
vestment in the NMS, which is and bears a cost of financing the foreign in-
vestment
11 1 1 , 1 () ( ) / υ κγ υ =+ FDI DF D I K Y
,1 TTK F D I PAFK
,1
* ,
() δ + TF rP
*
1
D I K. Altogether, the EU-15 final goods firms maximise the following 
profit Π  when deciding on horizontal FDI,  
      (16)  *
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where r* is the real interest facing the EU-15 and AC1 is a similar adjustment cost related to 
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 (17) 
where λ1 is the shadow price on FDI1 capital. In the long-run equilibrium, when the conver-
gence of the NMS ends and the shadow price goes to unity, there is no incentive for the firms 
to make horizontal FDI into the NMS as there is no longer a cost advantage related to this 
production component. During the convergence path, higher GDP (Y*) in the EU-15 creates 
an incentive to carry out investment in the NMS, as is also caused by a lower cost of FDI, 
likely to be linked e.g. to the EU membership of the NMS. 
Turn then to consider offshoring of production of intermediate goods through vertical FDI. 



















PP  (18) 
where PT is again the price on tradables Q* and *
M P is the price on intermediate goods, to 
be defined below. We see from this expression that a lower price of intermediate goods 
leads to a rise in the value added price of EU-15 production and thereby to a rise in 




M P towards PT during the conver-
gence process leads to a reduction in so that this gain erodes over time. If the global 
demand for the EU-15 final goods Q
* remained unchanged – as is often erroneously imag-
ined – there would be a reduction in EU-15 production if there is a relocation of domestic 
production to the NMS. But this is not the final outcome as the productivity and the rate 
of return on capital in the EU-15 rises through international outsourcing, which will lead 
to a rise in capital accumulation and production, see Section 5.2 below for an empirical 
evaluation of these diverse impacts.  
*
Y P
The intermediate goods demanded by the final goods firms in the EU-15 can either be pro-
duced domestically by the domestic intermediate goods firms, the output of which is MDOM, or  13
outsourced by the final goods firms to be produced in the NMS through offshoring, now ver-
tical FDI. The amount of these imported goods is MIMP. The aggregate bundle M* of the in-
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where  is the elasticity of substitution between the home and imported intermedi-
ate goods and the ai’s are the distribution parameters summing to unity. As there is perfect 
competition, the corresponding price index on aggregate intermediate goods is, 
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where   is the price on the domestically produced intermediate goods, see below Eq. 
(27).  
DOM P
As stated above, we further assume that the EU-15 final goods firms outsourcing their 
activity through vertical FDI to the NMS (being there a part of the open sector in the 
NMS) can produce there at the same level of productivity A* with which the final goods 
firms can operate in the EU-15. This corresponds to the idea related to offshoring by 
Grossman nad Rossi-Hansberg, see Baldwin (2006, 40). However, due to competition, the 












where cT is the unit cost of tradables comprising of the labour and capital cost per unit of 
production in the NMS. 
The firms in the final goods sector in the EU-15 also bear a cost related to international 
outsourcing through vertical FDI. Now these firms set the aggregate demand for the in-
termediate goods given by * ξ = M Q and they decide on the amount of this to be out-
sourced to the NMS. 
Let us first note the relation between the vertical FDI stock and the ratio m which is the 
share of total production outsourced to NMS, / * = IMP mM M. We get 
  1
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where η is roughly a constant as it depends on the capital intensity, which further depends on 
the real interest rate r* which is roughly fixed in terms of tradables. A similar expression 
holds for the production in the NMS linked to horizontal FDI there. Total FDI stock is 
now .  
,1 FDI Q
,2 FDI K ,1 =+ FDI FDI KK
The cost D2 of offshoring is now specified in a way which somewhat modifies that by 
Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007) so that the real cost is , 
and . The firms minimize the total cost TD2 of their intermediate goods 
when some of their intermediate goods are offshored abroad, which is  
22 2 () * ( /) υ κγ υ =+ Dm M m
22 ,0 , κγ ν >> 1 14
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Using Eq. (22), minimizing the total cost of producing intermediate goods gives with 
some manipulation the following outcome for the optimal degree of outsourcing m,  
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We assume in (24) that in this optimum also the sunk cost 2 κ of making FDI in the NMS 
is covered. Let us assume as normal that the elasticity of substitution is higher 
than unity so that initially the second term on the left-hand side of (24) is positive when 
so that we get a unique solution for the optimal m which is likely to be posi-
tive. The higher is the cost γ2 of monitoring and establishing a subsidiary in the NMS, the 
smaller is the degree of international outsourcing, as is plausible. On the other hand, the 
incentive to outsourcing diminishes over time as the nominal convergence in the NMS 
proceeds, i.e. when the ratio  rises towards parity.
() 1 1 σ − −
< IMP DOM PP
/ IMP DOM PP 5 Based on (24), even before 
the situation of complete nominal convergence, offshoring comes to an end. Altogether we 
get from Eq. (24) for the optimal m*,  
   (25)  *
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2
1
To derive a dynamic behavioural equation for offshoring in the form of vertical FDI, we 
minimise the sum of quadratic terms for out-of-equilibrium and cost-of-adjustment terms, 
the latter defined as . This leads to the follow-
ing equation, 
2
22 1 (1 *) ( / 2)( ) , 0 −
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with parameters  , , , 1230 π ππ> depending on r* and a 2, with  123 1 π ππ + +=
m
. In a well-
known manner the solution for  is a weighed average of its lagged value  and the 
future desired values , see e.g. Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002, 398). 
t m 1 − t
*
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The domestic intermediate goods firms in the EU-15 simply use units of labour to 
meet their demand and produce their output. The price of domestically produced interme-
diate goods is thus,  
INT
L A
   (27)  */ = INT
DOM L PW A
The aggregate demand for labour   in the EU-15 is thereby 
*
TOT L
   (28) 
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TOT L LL Q A .
* M
                                                     
where . The wage rate is solved from the equilibrium in the final goods 
sector in the EU-15. We assume that productivity in the intermediate goods sector is lower 
than that in the final goods sector, which leads to the productivity effect related to offshor-
ing discussed above, see Section 5.1. Real GDP in the EU-15 is equal to Y*. The GNP 
(denoted by YI*) in the EU-15 is accordingly, 
() 1 =− INT Qm
 
5  A full parity of these prices is not, however, a necessary final outcome as the productivity of the intermediate 
goods sector is lower than that in the open sector in the EU-15, see below. This hinders full convergence of 
the respective prices.  15
  . (29)  * ** ( / ) (* )( / ρ =+ − − TY F D I F D I Y YI GDP P P i K P P U * )
There remains to specify that labour which migrates from the NMS comes to the EU-15 
so that 
  ( )
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,, . 0 =− − TOT t TOT t LL L L 0  (30) 
4  THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The supply of tradables from the enlarged EU can have an effect on the balance between 
their demand and supply in the global market as the EU is a big player in these markets. 
Denote by QROW the exogenous supply of tradables from the rest of the world. We can 
then define the balance between the global aggregate supply and demand DT as 
  ,1 *+ ++= TF D I R O W QQQ Q D T
*
. (31) 
Assume further that the supply from the rest of the world is in the baseline a fixed share 
s of the total market, which grows at an exogenous rate gW and the demand which reacts 
with price elasticity ε. Altogether we have then for the market clearing, 
  *
,, 1 0 (1 ) ( / ) ε − ++ = − W gt
tT tF D I t T t G t QQ Q s D e PP , (32) 
which solves for the global price path of tradables in terms of the exogenous overall 
global price level . This means that an increased supply from the NMS through horizon-
tal FDI from the EU-15 and indirectly through the final goods sector in the EU-15 can 
have an adverse terms-of-trade effect on the EU-15 through its effect on the balance in the 
global market for tradables. In this way the relocation through horizontal FDI creates a 
competition between the various locations of production. 
*
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5 SIMULATIONS  OF  CONVERGENCE 
5.1  Calibration of the Model 
Throughout we will use data from 2005 as the initial equilibrium and to calibrate the 
model. In the NMS, the average initial relative income level (at PPP) is 47 per cent, price 
level 52 per cent, and wage level 24 per cent of those in the EU-15. Consider first TFP 
growth. Using the so-called β-convergence in Eq. (10), NMS countries will grow faster 
than the wealthier EU-15. The basic empirical result given by growth literature is that 2 
per cent of the initial gap in income levels is closed every year. In the case of the new 
member countries of the EU, Kaitila (2004) has reached a result using pooled mean group 
estimation and fixed effects that the speed of unconditional convergence towards the EU-
15 was much higher in 1993-2002, on average 8 per cent per year. Anyway, this implies 
that we cannot set the convergence speed as a constant over the whole catching-up phase. 
Using the equilibrium condition mentioned above in connection with Eq. (10), 
i.e., , the latter taken to be 1.4 per cent p.a., we can calibrate the parameter β1 to be 
roughly 0.03 from the condition that the initial growth rate g0 of TFP (3 per cent) of the 
*
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new member countries is near the actually realised one at the initial income gap of 50 per 
cent. In the NMS, the initial rise in TFP in the open sector is fixed at 1 percentage point 
higher and in the closed sector at 0.5 percentage points lower than the average where we 
have assumed that initially the open sector is assumed to have 30 per cent of total em-
ployment  
  The elasticity of capital in production in Eqs. (1) and (15) is assumed to be 0.4. Parameter 
aT in (2) reflects a realistic adjustment and sensitivity of investment behaviour with respect to 
the rate of return. It is fixed at 20, which corresponds to Hall (2004). The annual rate of 
depreciation is taken to be 5 per cent. 
The substitution parameter φ in (3) is quite crucial in many ways as it in part determines 
the internal resource allocation in the NMS. It is fixed at unity. Parameter ψ in (11) is set 
to 0.05, similarly as in Haskel, Pereira and Harrison (2002).  
Calibration of the consumption equation in (6) and (8) takes place so that we first fix 
the propensity parameter c in Eq. (8) to be 0.7 and then calibrate the share h of the for-
ward-looking consumers to be 4 per cent from the condition that the aggregate consump-
tion matches the realised one in the base year.  
The rise in the total factor productivity is fixed at 1.4 per cent p.a. in both production 
sectors in the EU-15. The annual rise in the global price level   is fixed at 2 per cent. 
The nominal interest rate in the NMS is 5 per cent and will stay at this level throughout. 
The interest rate margin for the firm sector in the NMS and EU-15 is fixed to one percent-
age point and for the household sector borrowers in the NMS to 2 percentage points p.a. 
*
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The elasticity μ in the labour migration equation (9) is fixed at 0.00001, which will lead 
to a reduction of 7 per cent in the NMS labour force over the time span, and to an increase 
of less than 2 per cent in the EU-15 labour force, an outcome which is in line with esti-
mates typically reached in migration studies for the enlarged EU, see e.g. Alho (2003). 
The migration flows will gradually dampen over time.  
The transfer U to the NMS from the EU budget is calibrated so that initially it is equal to 
1.3 per cent of their GDP, and it will then decline over time as convergence proceeds so that 
the elasticity of the transfer from the EU budget with respect to the income level is −0.025 as 
estimated by Kauppi and Widgrén (2004).6 The transfer is financed by levying a tax on labour 
in the EU-15.  
For the EU-15, we specify that intermediate goods production is a half of gross produc-
tion, a typical value, and that a half of EU-15 imports from the NMS are made by inter-
mediate goods. This implies that in relation to the EU-15 GDP offshored intermediate 
goods from the NMS make only 0.8 per cent. Somewhat arbitrarily we assume that the ini-
tial labour productivity in the intermediate goods production in the EU-15, being under 
the threat of offshoring, is around 20 per cent lower than that in the final goods production 
sector. It should be remarked that this is quite an important assumption as to the results. 
The one made corresponds to the spirit of the globalisation analysis by Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,b), but is, however, in conflict with the actual relative productivity 
between the intermediate and final goods production. Namely, Finnish input-output tables 
reveal that the average labour productivity is, using the amount of produced intermediate 
goods as weights, clearly higher both in the total economy and manufacturing than the av-
erage productivity in the economy. This is based on the fact that many industries produc-
                                                      
6  The impact of structural funds on income disparities have been analysed in Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2003). 
They find some evidence that the funds contribute to a decrease in disparities. Baldrin and Canova (2003) 
argue, however, that structural funds are not able to affect long-run growth rates in the NMS.  17
ing intensively intermediate goods are very capital intensive. It is, however, doubtful 
whether this fact properly reflects the basic issue concerning the risk of offshoring of jobs, 
and thereby we are inclined to have a formulation which more corresponds to the insight 
of the theoretical literature on globalisation. 
The elasticity of substitution in (19) between the foreign and domestic intermediate 
goods is fixed to 5 following roughly estimation in Alho (2005). The vertical and horizon-
tal FDI stocks are in the initial situation taken to be equal. The cost of adjustment parame-
ter in horizontal FDI is roughly the same as for the overall capital stock in NMS, i.e. 20. 
The adjustment equation for offshoring, i.e. vertical FDI, follows (24) with equal weights 
for past, current and future desired values for degree of offshoring. We use the value 2 for 
the exponent υ in Eqs. (17) and (24). We calibrate the cost parameter γ2 from the condition 
that the initial corresponds to the equilibrium in Eq. (24). The parameter γ1 is calibrated 
in a somewhat ambiguous way so that we assume that 0.1 percentage points of the initial 
rate of return on horizontal FDI goes to the cost of running a foreign subsidiary.  
0 m
The interesting variables for the EU-15 are GDP, GNP (gross national income), and the 
income of the incumbent EU-15 population. GDP and GNP may diverge because of the 
gap in the rates of return on capital between the two regions, the burden of the foreign 
debt and the transfer through the EU budget to the NMS. The income of the incumbent 
EU-15 population is important, as there will be migration from the NMS to the EU-15, 
which can divert the total incomes and those of the incumbent EU-15 population from 
each other. In calculating this variable we assume that the immigrants from the NMS only 
bring with them their labour input and no capital. 
5.2 Simulation  Results 
We will then report the results for the numerical simulations. First we will report the base-
line solution for the NMS specified in Sections 2–4. We will extend the simulations over 
the period 2006-2031. Throughout we use constant, but not predetermined, levels for the 
jump variables as terminal conditions in the forward-looking solution of the model. 
Then from the EU-15 countries’ point of view we will formulate an alternative conver-
gence path with the aim to shed light on the impact of relocation and FDI by varying their 
degree. So, in the baseline scenario, FDI and offshoring are allowed to react according to 
the behavioural equations specified above in Sections 3 and 4. In effect, this means that 
the real FDI stock will grow 3.5 times in comparison to the initial level over time. In the 
alternative scenario 1, we retain the FDI stock (both its components) of the EU-15 coun-
tries in the NMS as fixed in volume terms at its level in 2005 all through the simulation 
period. This level is 0.6 per cent of the initial capital stock in the EU-15. 
The real GDP growth rate and inflation in the NMS in the baseline scenario are pre-
sented in Figure 4. The growth rate diminishes only slightly in spite of the effect of β-
convergence. This is due to the fact that investment activity remains vigorous. What 
strikes is the fairly persistent inflation which casts a shadow over the accession of the 
NMS into the Euro Area. The speed of real and nominal convergence of the NMS is pre-
sented in Figure 5. A parity in real incomes between the NMS and the EU-15 will be al-
most reached by the end of the time span. The rise in real incomes and the inflationary 
process are quite rapid with an average annual rise in wages of 9.4 per cent. There is a 
fairly constant internal allocation of resources between the sheltered and open sectors, but 
over time more resources will be shifted to the sheltered sector in the NMS.  
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Figure 4.  Trend of real GDP growth rate and inflation in the NMS in the base-
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Note: Trend of H-P filter. 
Figure 5.  Real and nominal convergence of the NMS in the baseline scenario, 















Sustainability in terms of foreign balance shows that the current account deficit is not a 
problem. However, it should be remarked that this result quite sensitively depends on the 
growth rate of investment in the open sector which is influenced by the speed of adjust-
ment parameter aT in Eq. (1) and the interest margin.  
Due to migration, the labour force in the NMS shrinks by around 7 per cent, slightly 
less in the baseline scenario where the rise in real wages is faster in the NMS. 
Turn then to consider the effect of the convergence process also on the EU-15. We first 
depict the impact of more intensified integration on the level of GDP volume in both re-
gions, i.e. the baseline in relation to the alternative scenario 1, see above, in Fig. 6. We 
observe that deeper integration is a win-win situation so that both the host and recipient 
region benefit from more intensified FDI and offshoring. However, the simulation hints to 
the fact that the growth impulse will start to diminish and level off. This is based on the 
fact that the two regions will over time converge to be more similar in terms of cost and 
price levels and this leads to a reduced incentive for further integration. This is then in a 
way analogous to what Samuelson (2004) suggested to be one possible scenario of 
China’s global integration, where no further gains will be reaped by the US if China spe-
cialises similarly in terms of factor contents as the US, see on this e.g. the discussion in 
OECD (2007b) and in terms of relocation Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004).  
In the EU-15 the relocation of domestic manufacturing to the new member countries 
will lead to a rise in GDP. This stems from the fact that the productivity growth will ac-
celerate, see Fig. 8. However, at the same time there is a decline in the wage rate, which 
reflects the job effect by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,b) and Baldwin (2006), as 
discussed above. The magnitude of these effects is fairly small, however, a result reached 
in many globalisation studies. Overall, the job reallocation effect is that almost 2 per cent 
of the EU-15 labour force will face reallocation from the intermediate goods to the final 
goods sector during the period. The price effect is also depicted in Figure 8. It shows that 
offshoring leads to a slight terms of trade loss in the EU-15 as expected. However, in 
terms of real wage there is a small loss due to relocation within Europe.  20
Figure 6.   The effect of more intensified integration on GDP volume (baseline in 


























Figure 7.  The impact of more intensified integration on the EU-15 (baseline in 
relation to the alternative scenario 1), as to the levels of productivity, 














The picture of offshoring is completed by considering its effect on the real gross na-
tional income (GNP) and the real income of the incumbent EU-15 population. These are 
depicted in Figure 8. Due to more offshoring, national income will rise clearly more than 
GDP because of the return on a larger stock of FDI. The incumbent population will gain 
more than the whole population (including the migrants) as they are assumed to own the 
whole capital stock of the EU-15 firms at home and abroad. This outcome, when com-
bined with Figure 7, shows that more integration in the form offshoring will generate ad-









Figure 8.  The impact of more intensified integration on the EU-15 (baseline in 
relation to the alternative scenario 1), as to the level of real gross na-
tional income (gnp) and the real income of the incumbent EU-15 popu-












We have sought to shed new light on the speed of real and nominal convergence of the aver-
age of the new EU member countries towards the average of the EU-15 countries. The analy-
sis covers both convergence of real income and nominal convergence in terms of the price and 
wage levels. This comprehensive approach to the convergence process is vital for both coun-
try groups and therefore for the whole Union. 
First, we constructed a two-sector model of production for the NMS in the Balassa-
Samuelson tradition, and then enlarged it in several ways to capture key issues of the conver-
gence process. At the same time we also enlarged the model to cover two regions by endogen-
ising FDI flows from the EU-15 to the NMS and allowing for interaction between the regions 
through offshoring of EU-15 production in the NMS. Thereby we were able to address the 
current concern over relocation of production and jobs from the EU-15 countries to the new 
member countries. 
Our general result on the speed of convergence of the NMS showed that it crucially de-
pends on the speed of capital accumulation there. However, not surprisingly, there is consid-
erable uncertainty related to the speed of convergence. Both the NMS and the EU-15 GDP 
will benefit slightly due to offshoring, but the latter at the cost of downward adjustment in 
wages. However, the quantitative magnitude of these impacts is fairly small, which suggests 
that the growth problems can and should be solved internally within the EU-15, and that fears  23
of relocation, at least with respect to the NMS, should be kept limited. The basic reason for 
the overall small impacts reached in the paper is the fairly small initial current amount of off-
shoring between the EU-15 and the NMS. As estimated by the OECD (2007a, 36), the overall 
share of offshoring (imported intermediate inputs in the total economy) is typically around a 
quarter. However, the bulk of this activity, as also FDI flows, takes place within the group of 
developed OECD countries.  
The model built here is, of course, quite a crude description of the economy. Although 
we enlarge the basic framework in several realistic ways, the model has its shortcomings. 
For example, the public sector is very rudimentary and is considered only through the EU 
budget. All other forms of taxation have been discarded so that, in effect, tax competition 
is omitted. However, despite these deficiencies we believe that the analysis sheds new 
light on the topical issue of convergence and its link with relocation of EU-15 production 
to the new member countries. It should also remarked that we have not yet tried to capture 
the cyclical pattern like the effect of the current downturn on convergence but tried to cap-
ture the trend factors driving the convergence path over the long run.  
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